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Foster: The Federal Insurance Guaranty Corporation: A Proposal

THE FEDERAL INSURANCE GUARANTY
CORPORATION: A PROPOSAL
In 1969 automobile accidents accounted for an estimated $16
billion in economic loss. Because of the staggering liability that
is associated with the operation of motor vehicles, individuals
are dependent on insurance companies to provide "financially
responsible defendants" who can bear these losses. All too often,
both parties to an accident are disappointed to find that the
insurance company is not financially responsible because it is
insolvent. The injured party finds that he has no one to sue; the
insured party finds that what property he has is in jeopardy
because the promise for which he has paid, the payment of
liabilities arising from an automobile accident, cannot be fulfilled by the insolvent insurance company. Additionally, the
state finds its attempts to protect its citizens from the costs of
automobile accidents through insurance frustrated by the insolvent company's inability to pay. This note deals with one
proposed solution to this problem of the insolvent insurance
company-Senate Bill 2236 which would create the Federal
Insurance Guaranty Corporation.' Though the bill deals with
"any enterprise engaged in the business of issuing or reinsuring
property, casualty, or surety insurance policies ' 2 or reinsuring
policies in interstate commerce, this note will principally examine automobile liability insurance problems.
First, the problem of the insolvent casualty insurance company
will be delineated. Second, the proposed guaranty corporation
will be discussed in some detail. Third, criticism of the plan will
be made in order to evaluate its substantive merits. And, fourth,
the insurance industry's reaction to the proposal will be discussed.
By way of introduction, the proposal for the guaranty corporation seeks to create a federal corporation to guarantee payment of liabilities not met because participating insurers become.
financially insolvent. The basic motivation for such a corporation stems from a concern over the increasing number of uncompensated victims and policyholders and the substantial number
of companies that have failed in the last few years. Industry
opposition to the proposal centers around two fears: fear of
1. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)

(referred to the Committee on Commerce,

2. S. 2236, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.

§ 6(1) (1969).

May 29, 1969).
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federal regulation of the industry and fear of compulsory insurance plans under political control. State concerns originate from
a fear that the ability to regulate the industry at a state level
will be lost.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBlE-

A significant number of casualty insurers have become insolvent in the last few years. Determining the precise number for
any given year is a difficult problem for a number of reasons.
First, there are no national statistics available, and information
must consequently be obtained separately from the various state
insurance regulatory commissions. The reporting procedures used
by such commissions are not standardized. State definitions of
insolvency vary, and the dispositions made of financially distressed companies differ from state to state. As a result of these
disparities, such statistics as are available can only be used to
indicate a general trend rather than to pinpoint existing abuses
and delineate definitive patterns.
The insolvency problem is a part of the larger concern with
the high cost of automobile accidents.3 The problem of insolvent
casualty insurers of high risk drivers first gained national atten4
tion as a result of Senator Thomas Dodd's investigation in 1965.
His summary of the findings of that investigation reveals the
extent of the problem.
We discovered that from 1960 to 1966 seventy-three
companies out of 350 engaged in this kind of business
collapsed financially, leaving -well over a million persons without insurance.
This investigation uncovered an insolvency problem
of such magnitude that it may rank as one of the
greatest insolvency crises in the history of the insurance industry.
In 1964, 1965, and 1966 forty-four high risk auto
insurance companies failed.
Since there are approximately 350 companies doing
this type of business, it statistically follows that 12.6%
of these companies toppled in this three-year period
3. CRisis IN CAR INSURANCE (R Keeton, J. O'Connell, T. McCord ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as CRisis].

4. Hearings on S. Res. 40 Before the Subcom. on, Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12 (1965) [hereiaafter cited as 1965 Hearings].
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alone. That averages out to an annual failure rate of
4.19%.
Businesses in general are currently failing at the rate
of approximately six-tenths of one percent every year. 5
After these hearings in 1965, the Senate Anti-trust Subcommittee conducted hearings on a broader scale; these 1968
hearings investigated auto insurance as a whole and were not.
limited to high risk auto insurance companies. High risk auto
insurance companies are those companies which specialize in
writing insurance on drivers who, because of their poor driving
record, or for other reasons, have been deemed to be a greater
insurance risk. To cover this greater risk, the insurance companies are allowed to charge a higher premium than that allowed
for normal or ordinary risks. Presumably, since they are allowed
to charge a higher rate for these risks, it would be thought that
they would have no trouble in providing adequate coverage. But,
as a matter of fact, they have failed at an alarming rate. As
Senator Hart asked, "Why is the high-risk market and the
assigned risk population constantly growing in an industry
which speaks glowingly of competition?"O
An industry spokesman asserts that "[mIore than 100 small

7
high risk companies have gone bankrupt in the last 10 years."

This same source defines the broader problem this way:
Automobile registrations, licensed drivers and mileage
driven keep rising year by year. Registrations now
exceed 100 million cars driven a trillion miles by more
than 100 million licensed drivers. Some 900 individual
insurance companies collected in 1969 about $13 billion
in automobile insurance premiums, 45% of total property/liability writings, and few were happy about it.
Big numbers and big problems prevail in all phases of
auto insurance.
In 1969 automobile accidents killed more than 56,000
persons, injured 4.5 million men, women, and children,
5. Hearings on S. Res. 233 Before the Subcom. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt 13, at 7394 (1968)

[hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].

6. Id. at 7390.
7. Kellogg, Review and Preview, 70

BEST'S

ed. Jan. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Kellogg].
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and produced a total estimated economic loss of at least
$16 billion.
The insurance industry has been saddled with and
blamed for a variety of vexing and so far insoluable
problems not of its own making. With the possible exception of lawyers, the present tort liability system
satisfies virtually no one. Insurance companies are fed
up with mounting losses and undeserved criticism;
regulatory authorities and politicians are under pressure; car owners are unhappy with constantly rising
costs; young and accident prone drivers dislike revictims
stricted markets and surcharges; and accident
8
complain about delayed loss statements.
Complicating matters, from an industry point of view, is the
fact that casualty underwriting is unprofitable, when profits are
figured on an adjusted basis. "[A]utomobile bodily injury liability is . . . about 5.5% in the red, on an adjusted basis, and 1969

represents the 15th consecutive year the stock companies have
lost money on auto bodily injury to boost the statutory loss to
some $1.8 billion, about 6% of $33 billion earned premiums."
Automobile property damage is 10% in the red on an adjusted
basis. 10 Automobile physical damage is over 5% in the red on an
adjusted basis."- The industry figures its losses in this business
on the "statutory basis," which is the manner in which profits
are reported under state regulatory schemes. 12 However, when
investment income is included in the companies' figures, the
industry shows a $7 billion profit.'3

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id.
See R KENNEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
STRENGTH 164-69 (4th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as R. KENNEY]. Basically,

statutory underwriting profit ignores investment income, a major source of insurance company income. This is why companies continue to pay dividends,
even with losses. "Statutory underwriting profit" is the balance remaining after

losses incurred, loss adjustment expenses incurred, and underwriting expenses
incurred are deducted from "earned Premiums" ("premiums which actually
belong to the company after release from the unearned premium reserve").

Id. at 165.
13. 1968 Hearings, pt. 14, at 8536. (From a statement of Senator Hart
characterizing the period 1967-68, the latest period for which truly complete
figures are available.)
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The Federal Insurance Guaranty Corporation Act is closely
modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act 14
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Act,;
and is intended to "protect the American public against certain
insurance company insolvencies."' 16 A basic outline of the structure of the corporation as set forth in the bill is here presented
to provide a background for understanding the operation and
scope of authority of the corporation.
A. ControZ
The operations of the Guaranty Corporation will be overseen
by a three-man Board of Directors. Section 3 of the bill provides
that the Comptroller General of the United States will be one
of the members of the Board. The President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoints the other two members. No more
than two of the three directors are to be of the same political
party. The President designates one of the three as Chairman of
the Board. The three serve six year terms, or until their successor is appointed. "No member of the board of Directors shall
be an officer or director of any participating insurer or hold
stock in any participating insurer.' 7 Additionally, former board
members may not be employed by insurance companies for two
years after they leave the Board, unless they have served their
full six year term, in which case the provision of no employment
is inapplicable.
The Board of Directors appoints a nineteen-man Advisory
Committee to assist the Board. Section 4(a) (1) calls for the
membership of this committee to be composed of representatives
from the federal government, the general public, the insurance
industry, and state or local governments. The last category includes representatives of state regulatory authorities. Representation on the Advisory Board is qualified to include "[n]ot
more than six . . . regular full-time employees of the Federal
Government, not less than four . . . representatives of the private insurance industry, and not less than four . . . representa-

tives of State insurance authorities."'1 These members serve twoyear terms; government appointees serve only so long as they
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq. (1964).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1724 et seq. (1964).
16. S. 2236, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Preamble (1969).

17. Id. at § 3.
18. Id. at § 4(a)(1).
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continue in their government position, unless reappointed. 1 9 The
purpose of this Advisory Committee as set out in section 4(c)
is to
review general policies of the Corporation and advise
the Board of Directors with respect thereto, assist in
obtaining the corporation [sic] of insurers, industry
groups, and Federal and State agencies, consult with
and make recommendations to the Board with respect to
carrying out the purposes of this title .... 20

B. Finances
Original funding of the corporation is to come from a capital
stock of $50 million. The Secretary of the Treasury is to subscribe the original issue as a public debt transaction -which will
be repaid. Shares will be divided into one thousand dollar

units. 2 1 Thereafter, the fund will be composed of its capital stock

and the premiums collected pursuant to the scheme.2 2 The net
asset value of the fund is limited to "2 per centum of the annual
net direct premiums written by all participating insurers ....-23
The term "net direct premiums written" means direct
gross premiums written on property, casualty, or surety
insurance policies, less return premiums thereon and
dividends paid to policyholders on such direct busi24
ness.
Companies pay a fee of "one-eighth of 1 per centum of the net
direct premiums written by the participating insurer during the
year ... ."25 The assessment is paid in semi-annual install-

ments, and such payment preempts "any fee or assessment under
any State insurance insolvency or liability security fund law for
any period during which the insurance policies of that insurer
are guaranteed pursuant to this title."2 0
Section 15 permits the corporation to invest in United States
securities under specified conditions. The corporation can lend
to a failing insurer upon such terms as are set by the Board of
Directors.27 The corporation can borrow from the Treasury upon
19. Id.at
20. Id.at
21. Id.at
22. Id.at

§ 4(a)(3).
§ 4(c).
§ 5.
§ 10(a).

23. Id.at § 10(b).
24. Id.at § 6(5).

25. Id.at § 13(b)(1).
26. Id.at § 10(c).
27. Id.at § 16.
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a half billion dollars outstanding obligation. Exemption from
taxation of FIGO obligations is provided by section 17. Audits
and a yearly report to Congress are provided for,28 with scrutiny
by the General Accounting office. 29
C. Powers
Section 7 of the bill gives the Corporation the necessary
powers for its operation, such as the power to make contracts
and prescribe rules and regulations. Section 8(b), however, describes the truly controversial administrative powers of the
Corporation; this section provides:
The Corporation shall appoint examiners who shall
have power, on behalf of the corporation, to examine
any insurer or local insurer making application for
guaranty status or whose policies are guaranteed under
this title, whenever in the judgment of the Corporation
an examination of such insurer is necessary. In making
examinations of insurers or local insurers the examiners
shall have power on behalf of the Corporation to make
such examinations of the affairs of all affiliates of such
insurers as shall be necessary to disclose fully the relations between such insurers and their affiliates and the
effect of such relations upon such insurer.8 0
In an effort to mitigate the specter of federal regulation, this
section further provides that "[a]ll examiners appointed by the
Corporation shall cooperate as far as practicable with . . . the

appropriate State supervisory authorities and The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners."3 1 State authorities are
granted the right to review copies of the reports and to comment
on these reports. It should be pointed out that "'affiliate' or
'affiliates' as used in the foregoing subsections (b) and (c)
means any enterprise related directly or indirectly to the insur32
ance activities of the insurer or local insurer.5
Failure to cooperate with an investigation can result in contempt proceedings in federal courts.3 3 The Corporation is
authorized to grant immunity and waiver of prosecution to
overcome self-incrimination problems with reticent officials.
Companies who fail to comply with a specific recommendation
28. Id. at
29. Id. at
30. Id. at
31. Id.
32. Id. at
33. Id. at

§ 19(a).
§ 19(b).
§ 8(b).
§ 8(d).
§ 8(e).
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of the Corporation after the hearing process is completed face
publication of the disregarded recommendation after a 60-day
notice.34
Payment of the guaranty occurs only after state remedies have
been exhausted. A company must be declared insolvent by a
competent court, the Corporation must be notified of the insolvency, and the records and files of the insolvent company
must be made available to the Corporation before the Corporation is authorized to issue a certificate of assumption.35 Any
person who has a claim against the insolvent insurance company
"must
exhaust his claim against state insolvency funds, 36
the
Corporation being liable only for the excess not so satisfied out
of the state fund. Additionally, any statutory provisions or
policy right entitling an individual to recover from the company
37
must be used before the guaranty provisions may be invoked.
The Corporation becomes subrogated to the aggregate claims
paid from the guaranty fund against the company or its representative in insolvency proceedings. 8
The right of participation in the fund is conditioned upon the
filing of an application with the proper information3 9 and
agreeing to comply with regulations applicable while the guaranty is in effect. After approval of the application, an insurer
is issued a certificate and must, under such certificate, include in
each policy a statement that it is guaranteed by the fund. For an
interstate insurer who fails to meet the Corporation's requirements for guaranty of its policies, section 12 provides a thousand
dollar a day fine for each policy not guaranteed. These fines
may be assessed against the directors of the companies indi40
vidually if company assets are not sufficient to meet them.
Misrepresenting the fact that a policy is guaranteed carries a
41
one thousand dollar fine, or one year in prison, or both.
D. Provisions to Insure the Regularity of Company Affairs
The bill sets out rather extensive provisions to insure that
company affairs are conducted in a regular and businesslike
34. Id. at § 8(f).
35. Id. at § 9(a). Insurance companies are specifically exempted from federal bankruptcy provisions. Bankruptcy Act, § 4, 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1969). See
Valley v. Northern Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920). Individual
states provide their own scheme for dissolution of insurance companies.
36. S. 2236, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. § 9(f)-(g) (1969).
37. Id. The fund pays only the excess not covered through other remedies.

38. Id. at § 9(h).
39. Id. at § 11.

40. Id. at § 12(a).

41. Id. at § 12(b).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss5/5

8

Foster: TheSOuTHr
FederalCARomwA
Insurance Guaranty
Corporation: A [Vol.
Proposal
22
LAw REvmow

manner. The tenor of these sections is clearly intended to give
the Corporation information as changes in the company's operation occur. The drafters apparently hope that earlier receipt of
such information will enable the FIGC to act between the statutory reporting dates when any company action threatens the
solvency of the guaranteed company. Under state schemes of
regulation irreparable damage is often done before periodic
statutory reports are filed.
Section 13(h) (1) requires the chief officer of a guaranteed
company to report promptly any change in the control of voting
stock to the FIGO. Any doubts as to whether control will be
changed are to be resolved by reporting the stock transfer. Loans
secured by 25 per cent or more of the voting stock of another
participating insurer must be reported, unless the borrower has
been the owner of record of the stock for a year or unless the
stock is that of a newly organized insurer. The required reports
must contain:
(a) the number of shares involved, (b) the names of
the sellers (or transferors), (c) the names of the purchasers (or transferees), (d) the names of the beneficial
owners if the shares are registered in another name,
(e) the purchase price, (f) the total number of shares
owned by the sellers (or transferors), the purchasers
(or transferees) and the beneficial owners both immediately before and after the transaction, and in the case of
a loan, (g) the name of the borrower, (h) the amount
of the loan, and (i) the name of the insurer issuing the
stock securing the loan and (j) the number of shares
42
securing the loan.

The company must also provide other information so that the
Guaranty Corporation may see the full effect of the transaction.
Section 14 provides for termination of the guaranty status of
a company upon a finding by the Board of Directors that a participating insurer is engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice.
There are hearings on the practices found to be unsafe or unsound, and various time limits are set forth for correction. If the
company does not correct the deficiency within the specified
time, the Corporation is authorized to publish the objectionable
practice. Moreover, the FIGO is authorized to compel the company to give notice of such practice to its policyholders or the
42. Id. at § 13(h)(4).
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Corporation may send the notice itself. The determinations of
the Board of Directors of the FIGC
are subject to judicial
43
review as provided within the bill.
Real strength for the Corporation comes from its ability, after
hearings, to issue cease and desist orders which are enforceable
by injunction in the federal courts, as against officers and
agents, if the courts find that a violation of the order has
occurred or is about to occur. Companies are given the right to
have the courts alter the cease and desist orders. 44
In an effort to control unscrupulous operators and to prevent
so called "dummy"4 5 boards of directors, the bill provides in
section 14(d) that the FIGC may remove from office or suspend
from participation in the affairs of the insurer any officer,
director, or other person who
[hias committed any violation of law, rule, or regulation, or of a cease-and-desist order which has become
final, or has engaged . . . in any act, omission, or prac-

tice which constitutes a breach of his fiduciary duty as
such director or officer, and the Corporation determines
that the insurer has suffered or will probably suffer
substantial financial loss or other damage or that the
interest of the policyholders could be seriously prejudiced by reason of such violation or breach of fiduciary
duty, and that such violation or practice or breach of
fiduciary duty is one involving personal dishonesty on
the part of such director or officer .... 46

The suspension is effective after compliance with hearing requirements has been had. Additionally, indictment of an official
for a felony involving a breach of trust is specified as a ground
for suspension. Such suspension continues in effect until final
disposition of the charges. "A finding of not guilty or other
disposition of the charge shall not preclude the Corporation
from thereafter instituting proceedings to remove such director,
officer, or other person from office and/or to prohibit further
participation in the insurer's affairs . . . . 47 Penalties for vio43. Id. at § 14(a).

44. Id. at § 14(c).

45. "Dummy" boards are so named because they are made up of directors
whose prime asset is a famous name to draw policy holders. These directors
usually lack experience in the insurance field and are subject to manipulation
by those in actual control. This form of management can easily be abused by
the unscrupulous.
46. S.2236, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(d) (1) (1969).
47. Id. at § 14(e).
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lation of suspension proceedings and penal proceedings are a five
thousand dollar fine, or imprisonment for one year, or both.48
The fines for violation of this section are made personal against
the directors and the individuals involved.4 9
Ef. Hearings and Judicial Review
The hearings called for as part of the Corporation's enforcement pattern are to be held in the district where the insurer has
his principal office. All hearings are public, unless privacy is
needed to assure that the parties involved or the policyholders'
rights are protected. 0 Review of a final decision is exclusively
provided for in section 14(i) which details the applicable United
States Code sections and adequately protects the insurance companies' right of review.
III. CmTIcISMz AND EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CORPORATION
A. Federal Regulation of Insurance
Will the Federal Guaranty Insurance Corporation bring federal regulation of insurance? That is the way many regulators
and industry spokesmen would phrase the debate over the
FIGC; it is, however, misleading. For a number of years the
insurance industry was free from federal regulation under the
doctrine of the Paul a. Virginia5' which said that insurance was
not commerce among the several states and thus not subject to
regulation under the commerce clause. The landmark case of
United States v. South-Eastern Under-writers Associatio 52
changed this in 1944. Shortly after the Court pronounced insurance to be interstate commerce, Congress responded to state and
industry desires with the McCarran Act.53 Very basically, the
Act provided that the insurance industry was exempt from federal regulation as long as the states provided adequate regulatory measures. All of the states, quite naturally, had or quickly
enacted such legislation.64 Attempts to encroach on state pre48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at § 14(g).
Id. at § 14(h).
Id. at § 14(i).
75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168 (1869).
322 U.S. 533 (1944).

53. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (1964). McCarran Act, Act of Mar. 9, 1945,
Pub. L. No. 15, § 2; 59 Stat. 33 as amcnded by Act of July 25, 1947, 61 Stat.

448.

54. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 5, at 40-41 (3d ed.
B. Anderson 1951) [hereinafter cited as VANCE]. States acted through their
Insurance Commissioners to form the "All-Industry Committee" to draft
Model Acts. This was done through the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. The bills, with local variations and modifications, were enacted
in all but two jurisdictions.
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rogatives by the federal agencies were rebuffed by the federal
courts where state laws adequately dealt with the problem. 55
Today, however, broadly speaking, the insurance industry is
subject to regulation from the federal sector under various sections of the anti-trust laws, the National Labor Relations Act,
and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 56 The Federal Trade Commission can regulate "to the extent that such, business is not
57
regulated by State Law."
Matters relating to stock in an insurance company, assuming
sufficient size are, moreover, covered by Securities and Exchange Commission regulation.5 8 Investment aspects of insurance
can be divorced from state regulation of the promise in the
insurance contract itself. The SEC has become more involved in
insurance regulation in the last few years, since corporate stock
has been used in fraudulent life insurance schemes5" and there
has been a temptation on the part of many companies to get easy
capital through the use of stock offerings. 0
The Federal Trade Commission, under its section 5 authority,
has been successful in getting at mail order insurers in some
instances. This complex area, which involves policies offered
strictly through the mails with no other contact with the state, is
one which has been ineffectively controlled by a state-centered
scheme of regulation.61 The FIGC would help, since it is primarily concerned with interstate insurers.
The above broad outline of the history of federal regulation
of insurance companies raises several questions as to the possible
effect of the FIGC legislation. For purposes of discussion it
will be assumed that the term, "federal regulation," includes
federal standards for (1) what constitutes sound reserves to
meet claims, (2) a fair price for the policy, and (3) the form of
accounting reporting to be used. These three areas lie at the
heart of most current schemes of insurance company regulation.
55. See FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) and Travelers

Health Ass'n v. FTC. 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).

56. See VANCE, supra note 54, § 5, at 36-50.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964).

58. See R.

KENNEY,

mipra note 12, at 157-63.

59. The 1965 Hearingscontain details of stock defrauding schemes in several
states. The articular schemes there under consideration involved purchase of life
policies on company executives using casualty company stock as consideration.
The worthless casualty stock loss fell on the life companies who had to pay on
the key man type policies. The basic scheme, of course, had many variations.
60. See H. JosEpHsoN, THE CASE AGAINST NEW LIFE INSURANCE COM,PANIEs (1966)

[hereinafter cited as H. JosEPHSoN] for an explanation of the

misuse of new stock for high return on investment.
61. For a discussion of this problem, see R. KENNEY at 311-19.
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Senator Hart of Michigan, one of the sponsors of the bill, in
an address at the joint convention of the National Association of
Casualty & Surety Executives and the National Association of
Casualty & Surety Agents in the fall of 1969, "gave an unequivocal 'yes' ,702 to the question of whether "federal regulation of
insurance [will] supereede state regulations?" 6 3 Perhaps more
important, however, was this exchange:
Do you forsee that federal regulation will be superimposed on existing state regulation ?4
"No," Senator Hart responded. "When the time comes,
I am confident that the federal legislation for regulating insurance would specifically provide that where
state standards are higher than federal standards, the
state standards would apply. But it is very unlikely that
state standards would be higher than the federal standards."6 5
By the terms of the bill itself, state regulation is neither prohibited nor discouraged. For example, throughout the bille6 it is
provided that copies of information gathered pursuant to the
duties of the FIGO be provided the appropriate state regulatory
agency. By analogy to the prototypes for the FIGO legislation,
the FDIC and the FS&LC, neither of the latter is actually a
regulator of banks or savings institutions. Though the analogy
is admittedly inapposite in many points because of the complexity of state and federal banking regulation under other
measures, nevertheless, these corporations do not come close to
preempting the field of banking regulation. State regulatory
agencies continue to stay very active in that area.
It is also appropriate to note that this bill covers only the
casualty insurance industry. This is so because life insurance
companies have as a group taken care of their insolvent companies through merger or acquisition. 7 They have been able to
do this because life insurance is more profitable, on the whole,
than casualty insurance. The life insurance industry has also
been more jealous of its reputation for stability.6 8 Health and
62. 70 BEsT's REWv 5 (Property-Liability ed. Nov. 1969).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. §§ 6(11), 8(b), 8(f), 11, 14(a), and 14(d)(4).

67. See H. JosirpsoN, supra note 60.
68. Id.
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accident insurance is covered by such a variety of plans that
legislation that provided insolvency protection for this industry
would be difficult to draft. For example, the various Blue Cross
type plans would have to be adapted to a specific scheme as
would Medicare, Medicaid, and Workmen's Compensation type
legislation. At the present time, such complexity is undesirable
and would introduce an unnecessary factor into an area already
saddled with skyrocketing costs. Besides, life insurance and
health and accident insurance companies are not generally exhibiting the financial problems that casualty insurance companies are demonstrating. Fire insurance, a portion of the
casualty section of the industry, is also holding its own.69
Realistically, much of the industry's opposition to the FIGO
is based on a fear of spreading federal jurisdiction into other
lines of insurance.
Robert Dineen-former New York Superintendent of
Insurance, former president of NAIC, retired Chairman
of Northwestern Mutual Life, and now a consultant to
NAIG-sees the FIGC as bringing more federal regulation to the insurance industry than it would purport
to, or more than the bill's friends in the industry would
like. In Mr. Dineen's view: "It is natural and inevitable
that the FIGO would eventually expand7 0its powers of
regulation to the life insurance industry."
In support of his contention that federal regulation is "no
panacea," Mr. Dineen cites the fact that federally regulated
banks lost $25 million in insurance company frauds, as well as
the fact that federal riot insurance under the Department of
Housing and Urban Development has proven less desirable than
it looked at first blush.1 1 At the same time that Mr. Dineen disdains the FIGC as bringing federal control of all facets of the
insurance industry and asserts the deficiencies of federal regulation, he "agrees,

. .

.that the states must act decisively to create

an interstate mechanism to guarantee insurer solvency.17 2 This
is in effect an admission of the obvious failure of the states and
the industry to deal adequately with the problem of insurer
solvency. His own solution would of necessity be interstate in
character and application.
69. Kellogg, supra note 7, at 74.

70.
after
71.
72.

Kilen, 70 BEST's REVIEW 78 (Property-Liability ed. Sept. 1969) [hereincited as Killen].
Id.
Id.
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Proposals detailing such interstate cooperation are somewhat
vague. Interstate cooperation outside of federal endeavors is
hampered by the lack of appropriate enforcement powers. Uniform acts73 and all-industry bills 74 are not effective when viewed

in the light of the reality of state political processes. State insurance commissions, whatever they are called in a particular jurisdiction, are subject to varying amounts of political influence and
control. Moreover, most insurance commissions are understaffed,
underpaid, and under-trained.7 5
Resolution of the dilemma of federal control of insurance
regulation brings into focus the disparity between the public's
idea of the effect of state regulation and the reality of its
capabilities. Indeed,
[ilt has been well said that the primary duty of an
insurance commissioner is to protect policy holders
against insolvency and generally loose underwriting
and claim practices on the part of insurance companies.
That has been the theme song of every convention of
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
which was ever held.
Noble though this theme be, however, it has its drawback in that the policy-buying public has com6 to expect too much of the state supervisory authorities. In
short, a license to do business within a state has come
to be regarded in too many circles as tantamount to a
guarantee of continued solvency when, as a matter of
fact, it is no such thing. The granting of a license
merely means that on a specific date, the company met
certain financial requirements. And history shows that
a great deal can happen 76in the insurance business between examination dates.
The announced goal of the Guaranty Corporation is to give the
public that which it now believes it has-a guarantee of solvency
of those insurers licensed to do business. The statement on a
policy that such policy is guaranteed can literally mean what it
says. This aspect of certainty commends the FIGO proposal.
assuming two factors: first, that the cost of such guarantee is
73. Proposed by the National Conference of Comnissioners on Uniform
State Laws.

74. See

VANCE

supra note 54, at § 5. The bills came from the activities of

the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
75. See 1968 Hearings at 8349 and R. KENNEY, supra note 12, at 315.
76. M. KENNEY, mtPra note 12, at 313.
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not too high, and second, that the degree of state control that
would be assumed by the federal government is effectuating the
FIGC's purposes is a desirable allocation of power vis ; vis state
and federal government. Both points are disputed.
Opponents point to the high cost of running the FDIC and
the FS&LC as an example of the inefficient manner in which
government programs achieve solvency. They point out, that
these corporations collect many millions more in premiums than
they pay out to cover losses of folded institutions. They argue
that insurance at this price is too high. This overlooks the fact
that these two bodies are themselves a form of social insurance
and that in addition to their actual payment to depositors their
standards and supervision contribute markedly to the overall
health of the industry; that is, they fulfill their primary goal
of protecting the public from shaky institutions. The basis of
the argument essentially becomes the oft-heard contention that
all bureaucracies, especially government bureaucracies, are
inefficient and costly.
Insurance companies themselves are no models of efficiency.
One of the prime values of the FIGC could be the streamlining
of data gathering and processing. 77 Perhaps such improvement
would lower Senator Dodd's estimate
-thatfor each $100 delivered in direct benefits to policy
holders, administrative and other expenses incurred by
insurers and others are $125 for automobile liability.
Furthermore, approximately 50 percent payout of premiums is low no matter what forms of insurance with
which it is compared.78
The desirability of federal regulation of insurance is an old
debate. The literature on the subject is overwhelming. 79 It is

interesting to note that the industry originally sought federal
regulation of itself in order to escape the varying state regulatory schemes. Arguments used by companies and regulators alike
often amount to mere "rationalizations"8 0 such as:
The case for state supervision is that it is here, we have
it, it is an established system, and for at least two gen77. See R. HENSLEY, CoMP1T~rIoN, REGULATION, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 208-09 (1962) [hereinafter cited as R. HENSLEY].
78. 1968 Hearings at 8547.

79. R. HENSLEY, supra note 77, at 208 n.4 lists a portion of the "staggering"
amount of material.
80. I& at 210.
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erations we have developed it and gotten accustomed to
it. Even if it is bad, we are used to it.81
If the "primary responsibility-whick is to regulate for solvency" 8 2 is to be met, insurance commissions of all 54 regulatory
jurisdictions must recognize the fact that "[m]any states are both
understaffed in their insurance departments and poorly staffed
in terms of the qualifications of their personnel."8 3 Federal
funding of the corporation could eliminate the salary differentials between government service and private industry. Competent, well-trained personnel could be hired; the availability of
such qualified personnel is essential to the control of the well
versed and well paid industry executives and counsel, since it is
obvious that what is not understood cannot be controlled intelligently. Too often, today, state commissions are dependent upon
industry sources for the very data they need to regulate effectively. The industry calls the tune in large measure.
In summary, although comprehensive regulation of the casualty industry by the federal government is not a goal of the
FIGO, it may be, depending upon further developments, a result
of such a program. The proposal, however, should be judged on
the merits of what it seeks to accomplish--solvency-and not on
speculations about its inevitable development.
B. Relation to Other Control-of-lnsolvency Devices
One argument against the FIGO is that standardization of
regulation prevents local experiment. In view of the whole automobile-traffic safety-insurance problem, perhaps such local
experimentation is more than mere rhetoric. This problem contributed to the creation of the Department of Transportation
which is now in the process of studying the whole automobile
safety question. 4 In the last few years several comprehensive
plans have been proposed and adopted; among them Massachusetts',8 5 Connecticut's, 0 and New York's87 are prominent. Significantly, none of these plans has been adopted in the state of
its origin. Massachusetts, in August, 1970, became the first state
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 211.
supra note 12, at 316 (emphasis by Mr. Kenney).
R. Immz'n,
Id. at 315.
S. J. Res. 129 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Cong. Rec. (1969).

85. R.

KEEToN &

J.

O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC Vicrut

(1965) [hereinafter cited as BASIC
86. This is the Cotter Plan.
87.

For

PROTECrION].

STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE

WHzosE BENEFIT?

(1970).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

DEr., AuTo 0Bon

INSURANCE.

17

1970]

South Carolina Law
Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 5
NoT Review,
.s

to adopt a variation of the no-fault type plan. 8 The conclusions
of these studies have dramatically pointed up the need to
improve the handling of claims from automobile accidents.8 9 The
FIGC can be reconciled with most of the proposals. Where there
is conflict, adaptation of state programs should not prove too
difficult.
Outside of the basic changes recommended by these plans,
variations of seven devices are currently being used by individual states in an attempt to deal with compensating a victim
who fails to find a financially responsible defendant. No one of
these seven is an answer in itself, and even combinations of them
do not alleviate the problem of the uncompensated victim. The
majority concern themselves with company solvency.
The uninsured motorist provision is a typical provision in an
automobile insurance policy.90 Three states require it by law. 91
Other states allow it, unless rejected by the purchaser. 92 This
clause generally provides that the insurer must pay any losses
occurring to one of its insured in an accident with an uninsured
motorist.93 Depending upon how "accident" and "uninsured
motorist" are defined, the clause has been more or less effective.
Critically, from a solvent defendant point of view "uninsured
motorist" should include one who has insurance with an insolvent company.
Three states have compulsory insurance.9 Compulsory insurance is not the solution many would think-interstate travel
plays havoc with such a plan. 98 Additionally, such programs
often have limits that preclude adequate coverage of the costs of
an accident; people may simply violate the law and drive without insurance.
Financial responsibility laws, 96 of two basic types, 97 are in
88. The Charlotte Observer, August 14, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 6.
89. See G. HALLMAN, UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT FUNDS 7 (1968). For an estimate of the staggering costs of auto accidents [hereinafter cited as G. HALLMAN].

90. Id. at 29 nn.14&15. At the end of 1967, 42 states had some form of unin-

sured motorist clauses; thirty-three states permit rejection of it. Id. n.15.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina.
95. BAsIC PRoTEcrIoN, supra note 85, at 77-102, particularly page 89 on the

Massachusetts plan. (Compulsory liability insurance here is used in reference
to private vehicles; nearly all states require it for common carrier.)
96. Id. at 102-09 and G. HALLMAN, supra note 89, at 28-34 give basic explanations of the varying plans.
97. BASIC PRoTacrioN, supra note 85, at 103-05. "Proof" type laws require
demonstration of ability to meet future claims. "Security" type laws require
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effect in most jurisdictions. The chief drawbacks of such laws
are the "one bite" provision9" and the fact that people do not
waste time suing a judgment proof debtor to help the next man
by requiring that the accident-causing party put up the required

security.
Unsatisfied judgment funds 99 and assigned risk insurance0 0
are two other approaches. There are the various impoundment
laws, but a stored, wrecked vehicle seldom covers the cost of the
accident. Motor vehicle liability security funds are extant in
Now York, New Jersey, and Maryland. 10 1 Other insurance may
lessen the social costs; for example, health and accident insurance may lessen the out of pocket expenses of a victim injured
by an uninsured motorist.
Development of these various approaches is not stifled by the
FIGO. Indeed, exhaustion of such local remedies is required
before the FIGO is allowed to pay. It would seem that enactment of the FIGO Act would be a welcome complement to state
programs, since solvent companies are a necessary ingredient of
all programs designed to protect the citizens of a state.
C. Oter Considerations
The FIGO does seek to insure a private market in insurance.
Another solution to insolvency would, however, be government
insurance. 10 2 Generally, this is not favored by any substantial
group at the present time. Increasing government participation
in insurance as a social measure has occurred in certain other
fields. 10 3 Other countries have experienced greater government
participation in the insurance field itself and in the regulatory
process, 0 4 but practically speaking, because of the nature of the
development of casualty insurance in the United States, such a
proposal is not at this time feasible or desirable.
demonstration of ability to meet claims out of the first accident up to the

statutory minimum. All states but Massachusetts have this provision now.
98. "One bite" provisions provide security for the second accident. The first
victim often remains uncompensated under such a provision.
99. See G.

HALLMAN,

supra note 89.

100. G. HALLMAN, supra note 89, at 28. This complex area is mentioned
mnerely as one method of meeting the problem of compensating victims by
increasing the number of potentially nonresponsible defendants with insurance
coverage.
101. Id. at 34-36.
102. See R. HENSLEY, supra note 77, at 211.
103. Government riot insurance is an example.
104. See ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNo-Ic CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
SurEnvsIoNq or PRIvATE INsuRANcE IN EURoPE (1965).
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Perhaps a federal guaranty scheme would enlarge the tools
available to fight against criminal elements in insurance. 10 5 The
stock dealing disclosure requirements would eliminate the ease
of manipulation currently available. 10
The creation of the FIGC may, however, have a substantial
effect on small insurers, since the presumably stricter standards
of the FIGC will be more of a problem for small insurers to
meet. Many of these companies are at a decided disadvantage
because they started with only a small amount of capital.10 7
Largely for that reason, Vestal Lemmon, then president of the
National Association of Independent Insurers, characterized this
proposal as "more dangerous a threat to the preservation of state
regulation and the future of the business than any other measure
08
with which the business has ever been confronted."
More equitable tax burdens are another possible effect of the
FIGO. The present taxation of insurance companies is a patchwork because of the varying nature of the state plans. Possibly,
more efficient management of reserves could be accomplished if
all funds could be concentrated in one place and the requirement
of state deposits were removed. Both of these considerations do,
however, involve an expansion of the present plans for the
FIGO.
D. Reaction of InvoZ7ved Parties
Reaction to the proposal has been mixed in the insurance industry, among regulatory authorities, and among political
circles. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners' 08
is opposed to the plan." 0 Their opposition is primarily based on
fear of federal domination of the regulation of insurance practices. They favor independent state guaranty funds.",
105. Recent scandals have pointed up the participation of criminal elements

in insurance schemes. Because such scandals have often involved manipulation

of companies in several states, jurisdiction over parties and enforcement of

personal responsibility have been difficult to accomplish. See 1968 Hearings.
106. See Killen, supra note 70, at 10, 11, and 74 for a discussion of the
manipulation of pink sheet values as a basis for a defrauding scheme.
107. See R. HENSLEY, supra note 77, at 48-52.
108. National Underwriter,May 5, 1967 at 1, col. 3.
109. The NAIC seeks: "To promote uniformity in legislation affecting insurance; to encourage uniformity in departmental rulings under the insurance laws
of the several states; to disseminate information of value to insurance supervisory officials in the performance of their duties; to establish ways and means
of fully protecting the interests of insurance policyholders of the various states,
territories and insular possessions of the United States." From NATIONAL
INSURANCE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 39 (R. Breitner ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as ORGANIZATIONS].
110. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1970, at 18, col. 3.
111. See 70 BEsT'S RFrvmw 80 (Property-Liability ed. Nov. 1969).
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The American Mutual Insurance Alliance 1n 2 and the National

Association of Independent Insurors"13 also oppose it. 11 4 By

contrast The American Insurance Association," 5 which writes
30% of all automobile insurance, favors the plan. This group is
also on record as favoring the adoption of some form of no-fault
0
system" 1
The bill itself has had many sponsors in both houses of Congress, but action on the proposal will probably await the results
of the study by the Department of Transportation.
IV. CqcLUsioN
The Federal Insurance Guaranty Corporation proposal carries
with it a certain degree of federal regulation. This is inevitable
with any entity capable of making rules and regulations that say
how an enterprise is to be conducted. The authority that determines the standards of an industry shapes that industry.
Whether or not the degree of control that will come with the
FIGC is desirable depends in large measure upon power allocations preferences and upon the need for nationwide control of
insolvency. The FIGC does allow states to continue their regulatory programs; the states would have to exercise that option. In
light of the developments since the McCarran Act, states would
in all probability continue their programs of control and merely
work the FIGC into the scheme.
The problem of insolvency is large. The present configuration
of the industry makes interstate problems inevitable, since the
reinsurance programs of companies almost always cut across
state lines in seeking to further the basic principle of insurance
of spreading the risk among a sufficiently large population so
that the business is profitable. When all companies seek to
achieve risk spreading through reinsurance, many companies are
usually affected by a single company's failure. Given the high
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 109, at 7-8.
113. Consists of fire, casualty and surety insurers of every type. Their

112. See

principal, common characteristic is that all consider themselves to
be independents, that is, opposed to all forms of forced regimentation, particularly as to such matters as rates, rules, classifications
and forms of coverage. To accomplish these aims the Association
keeps abreast of legislative trends, administrative and judicial
actions and cooperates with the industry organizations on matters
of common interest.
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 109, at 38-39.
114. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1970, at 18, cot 3.
115. See ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 109, at S.
116. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1970, at 18, col. 3.
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number of recent failures, some form of interstate cooperation is
necessary. The FIGC should provide the compulsion to achieve
the needed cooperation. The NAIC has not come forth with a
solution that the states, through their political processes, have
implemented. Therefore, the FIGC seems at present a worthy
proposal that can make a lasting contribution to reducing the
social costs of automobile accidents. The changes that the states
would need to make in their regulatory schemes and the requisite
amount of control that they would give up can be offset by the
increased efficiency that the FIGC would provide. States could
draw heavily on the reports of the FIGC. The representation
that the states would have on the Advisory Board should serve
as a check on the FIGC's preemption of the regulation of the
field, such preemption being more of an imagined fear than a
real one.
One of the chief values of the FIGC is that it guarantees
policies and not systems of insurance. This is desirable so that
the creative changes now being attempted to solve the many
problems of a fault insurance system can proceed as states feel
the need to alter the present system. Different state schemes can
live within the penumbra of FIGC protection.
It is to be hoped that the Department of Transportation
study, now being completed, will suggest further refinement in
the structure and operation of the FIGO. The FIGC proposal
can eliminate a portion of the complex automobile safety cost
problem with only minor disruptions of the present system and
with an ability to adapt to the future. Adoption of the Federal
Insurance Guaranty Corporation proposal, or one substantially
similar, is desirable and is recommended as a solution to the
growing problem of insolvent insurance companies.
WmLTA
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